

SECRET

Language for DCI Talk to GAC on Heritage  
Foundation Report on "Violations"

In negotiating and drafting both the 1972 and 1979 SALT agreements, both sides recognized that questions might arise concerning compliance with the terms of the agreements, as well as concerning related situations which either side might believe to be ambiguous. Since 1972, we have observed several instances of either ambiguous situations or Soviet activities which were of concern to us. (The Intelligence Community does not decide whether a "violation" of a provision of an agreement has occurred--that is a policy determination.) In these cases, we informed the national security policy-making community of the facts surrounding the incidents and the concerns were raised in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), a special bilateral body created in SALT I to deal with questions resulting from the implementation of and compliance with the agreements.

I am sure that many of you have seen the Heritage Foundation's May 1982 report on Soviet violations of arms control agreements. The Intelligence Community is familiar with the examples that are listed. Each incident was exhaustively studied and the facts and analysis communicated to the national security policymaking community. When required, the issues were raised with the Soviets in the SCC.

*Standing Consultative Comm*

The Soviets are not our friends--that is clear enough--and they are not about to make life easy for us, either in negotiating arms control agreements or subsequent requirements to verify compliance. They are wily negotiators and always endeavor to protect the weapons systems and programs that they consider important. They are secretive and do not willingly take steps to correct US ignorance or misperception when it works to their advantage. I believe, however, that the record on these issues does not support a charge of widespread Soviet violations or massive deception of US monitoring and analytical capabilities.

Our experience in this area, nevertheless, does yield a number of significant observations and lessons:

- 1) By and large, the Soviets have abided by the obligations that they assumed. The numerical limits in the ABM Treaty and SALT I Interim Agreement have not been exceeded. This situation, however, has not precluded disputes or tensions over the interpretation of certain obligations or dissatisfaction over the self-serving nature of some Soviet responses.
- 2) Soviet compliance has usually been to the letter of agreements, not to some more general "spirit."
- 3) The Soviets have not accepted US unilateral statements as binding.
- 4) When challenged about ambiguities, they have always responded. At times they have acknowledged a problem and resolved the situation. On other occasions, however, they have not acknowledged wrongdoing, and the response has seemed less than satisfactory.